A substantive amount of lab experimental evidence suggests that the norm of reciprocity has important economic consequences. However, it is unclear whether the norm of reciprocity survives in a natural and competitive environment with experienced agents. For this purpose we analyze data from a natural field experiment conducted with sales representatives who were instructed to randomly distribute product samples as gifts to their business partners.
Introduction
According to the norm of reciprocity people should respond to favorable treatment likewise. A great amount of evidence has been gathered in lab experiments indicating that many subjects behave consistently according to this rule. Scholars propagate that reciprocity plays a crucial role in sustaining provisions to public goods (see Fehr and Gächter (2000a) ), in facilitating the enforcement of incomplete contracts (see Fehr et al. (1997) ) and in the design of performance incentives (see Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) and Fehr et al. (2007) ). Moreover, reciprocal motivations are often held responsible for downward wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment (see Akerlof (1982) or Bewley (1999) ). Despite these important micro-and macroeconomic consequences the prevalence of social preferences in naturally occurring competitive markets remains largely unexplored.
1
Empirical evidence from such markets is important because the presumption that competition crowds out pro-social behavior is prevalent among economists.
2
In the present study we investigate whether the norm of reciprocity survives in a natural and competitive environment with experienced agents. For this purpose we analyze data from a natural eld experiment 3 conducted in a competitive business-to-business context. We advise sales representatives (the sellers) from a Swiss subsidiary of a large multinational consumer products rm to randomly distribute product samples as gifts to their business partners (the buyers) and record their sales performance.
Our eld experiment contributes to the literature in several ways. First, buyers do not know they are taking part in an experiment. Hence, their behavior is unaected by the experimenter demand eect which is potentially present in lab experiments. Moreover, the design is integrated into the daily routine of the sellers and therefore allows them to behave naturally. Second, in contrast to the usual student subject pool, the buyers are experienced market participants who should be acquainted with the commonly used persuasion methods in the sales business. 4 Third, the market is highly competitive due to its saturation. This business-to-business context should leave little room for social preferences 1 and consequently allows for a conservative test of the economic importance of reciprocity in natural markets.
The results are clear-cut, notwithstanding the conservative setting. We observe that the distribution of gifts helps in boosting sales revenue signicantly. Distributing a gift at the beginning of the negotiations with the store manager increases sales revenue by on average more than 340 percent. From the seller's viewpoint gift giving increases the eciency of her negotiations. Our results therefore corroborate previous lab experimental results on reciprocity. However, we also nd that the occurrence of reciprocity is conditional on environmental factors. Surprisingly, there is no indication for positive reciprocal behavior if buyers and sellers interact for the rst time.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes how the topic of this paper relates to existing literature. In Section 3 we present the experimental design and provide further background information. The experimental results are reported in Section 4. In Section 5 we conclude with a discussion of the results.
Related Literature
The bottom line of various lab experiments is that a non-negligible fraction of people reciprocate positively and negatively to friendly or hostile actions from other individuals even if reciprocating is costly (see Fehr and Gächter (2000b) for a survey). Fehr et al. (1997) argue that neglecting these reciprocal ...motives may lead to wrong predictions and to wrong normative inferences (p. 833). Several models have been proposed to incorporate reciprocal motivations (see Sobel (2005) for a survey). Natural eld experiments in the labor market have thus far provided only weak evidence for positive reciprocity in the wage-eort relationship (see Gneezy and List (2006) , Kube et al. (2006) , Al-Ubaydli et al. (2006) and Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) ).
5 List (2006) compares the behavior of the same population of sports-cards traders in both the lab and the eld. He discovers a positive correlation between oered prices and product quality in the lab. However, this link does not survive the step from the lab into the eld when quality cannot be veried. Levitt and List (2006) argue in their general review on the relation between eld and lab experiments that the lack of congruence between moral and wealth-maximizing actions can lead laboratory experiments to yield quantitative insights that may not be readily extrapolated to the outside world (p. 29). Our paper addresses this issue and tests for positive reciprocity in a competitive market with experienced market participants.
The distribution of free samples is a common practice among marketing practitioners (e.g. see Cialdini (1985) or Brandweek (1995) ). However, experimental evidence as to the economic importance of these gifts is astonishingly meager (Bawa and Shoemaker (2004) ). Moreover, the prevailing focus lays on familiarization with the product and the learning eect associated with the trial of the samples. 6 In our experiment, sales are made on the spot and leave the buyer no time for sampling the gift. Therefore we can sidestep learning eects.
Finally, recent eld experimental studies analyze social preferences in nonmarket contexts. 7 The setting most similar to this is that of Falk (forthcoming), who nds that enclosing gifts in solicitation letters provokes reciprocal behavior in donors and therefore increases the frequency of charitable giving. In contrast to most previous eld experimental studies on social preferences this paper goes beyond the non-market environment and focuses on a competitive setting.
Experimental Setup
The aim of this experiment is to identify the eect of gift giving in a natural market. This section describes the background, the experimental design and the behavioral predictions.
Background
The rm involved in our eld experiment is a Swiss subsidiary of a multinational consumer products producer. It operates in a saturated market that is characterized by a high degree of competition and eroding prot margins. We collaborated with a local oce consisting of ve eld sales representatives (the sellers). Three sellers are males and two sellers are females. All have profound work experience in the sales business. They work in dierent regions, covering the Swiss market. Sellers receive a xed wage without any explicit performance incentives. Their customers (the buyers) are retail shops, ranging from small independent stores to branches of large retail chains. Depending on the subjec-tively assessed importance, buyers are ranked into ve categories (A, B, C, D and E) by the rm.
At the design stage of the eld experiment we questioned the sellers about their sales strategies and routine. They regularly visit the buyers to present new oers and special promotions. The order of customer visits is determined by geographical proximity. They usually drop in without prior notice and try to address the manager of the retail store. In case the manager is not present, they speak to another member of sta. Often the sellers know the buyers personally but occasionally they encounter a buyer for the rst time. The sellers are equipped with a sales booklet containing about three to ve oers of dierent products. If a buyer wants a product, the sellers take the order using the forms in their sales booklet. Sales meetings last an average of approximately ten minutes.
With regard to our research question we were particularly interested in one aspect of sales strategies, namely the usage of gifts. It turned out that all sellers distributed product samples in past business negotiations. However, gifts were used infrequently and most importantly, they were mainly handed over after a deal. Buyers thus should not expect to receive a gift at the beginning of a sales meeting.
Design
Two weeks before the experiment started, the sellers attended a brieng led by one of the authors. They were informed about the fact that we intended to conduct a scientic experiment but they were not informed about our hypotheses. The sellers were instructed not to tell the buyers that this was an experiment. We clearly stated that the data would not be used for individual sales performance comparisons and that all data would be anonymized.
After a short introduction into the experiment and time schedule the experimental procedures were set out: The main treatment (Gift) and the control treatment (No Gift) were allocated such that every seller had to distribute a gift in roughly 50 percent of her sales meetings. The gifts had to be handed over as a free sample right at the beginning of the sales meeting. Each seller received a folder containing a sheet for every sales meeting. A text box containing the instructions (i.e. depending on the current treatment, whether they should distribute a gift or not) was placed at the upper part of each sheet. The order of the dierent sheets in each seller's folder was randomly assigned in advance. Sellers were told to work through the folder sheet by sheet without alternating the order. Concerning the sales pitch wording the sellers were instructed to use their usual sales strategy and, especially, to keep it constant across treatments. We purposely did not restrict the sellers' behavior by using a xed protocol so as to keep the situation as natural as possible.
8 All sellers were equipped with sales booklets containing ve oers and sold the same products.
9
The gift was a sample of the rm's products. It contained six tubes of toothpaste with a total cost of 10 Swiss francs (about 7.7 US Dollars), which is slightly more than the costs of gifts used in the past. The reason for choosing a product sample was that it makes the treatment variation unsuspicious. The customer would certainly have perceived a cash oering or some unrelated product in a dierent way. Furthermore, we wanted to use a gender-neutral gift.
In addition to the treatment instructions, the sheets also contained a questionnaire, which provides additional data for our analysis. The sellers were asked to ll out the rst half of the questionnaire before the sales meetings and the other half of the questionnaire immediately afterwards. The rst half contained questions about (i) the customer category (Category A, B, C, D or F ), and (ii) whether the buyer was visited for the rst time (Firstvisit). Right after the sales meeting the sellers had to indicate (iii) the number of oers they were able to show to the buyer (Oers shown), (iv) the sales revenue they actually made for each of the ve oers (Sales Revenue), (v) the duration of the sales meeting (Duration), and (vi) whether they negotiated with the store manager or not (Manager ).
10
The nal part of the brieng consisted of a practical example. In order to acquaint all of the sellers with the procedures, each sellers was presented with a hypothetical sales meeting situation and had to ll out the questionnaire.
The sellers collected the data during the months of January and February 2006 and sent it to the authors. They were identied by a code, keeping the anonymity of sources. In total we have observations from 220 sales meetings. 109 in the main treatment and 111 in the control treatment.
Behavioral Predictions
Should a consumer's decision to buy depend on whether he or she receives a gift or not? And if so, should the gift increase or decrease sales? If a buyer perceives the negotiation with the seller as a one-shot game then, under standard assumptions, there is no reason to take the receipt of the gift into consideration. Yet, it is also possible that the situation is perceived as a repeated game: Buyers could have a strategic incentive to buy more in order to increase the probability of receiving a gift in the future.
However, due to past gift giving practices this kind of repeated game argument is valid for both treatments. In the Gift treatment a buyer aims to increase the probability of receiving a gift at the next visit. The fact that, from time to time, buyers received gifts after the deal implies that they also have a strategic incentive in treatment No Gift. Buying more might increase the probability of receiving a gift right after the deal. Taken together, the incentive is even stronger in the No Gift treatment, since the gift is received immediately after the deal as opposed to somewhere in the future in case of treatment Gift (assuming that the buyers in the Gift treatment do not expect to receive another gift after the deal). Hence, under standard assumptions we would expect, if at all, a negative eect of the gift on sales revenue.
On the other hand, there is now ample lab evidence demonstrating the importance of reciprocal behavior in gift-exchange situations (see Fehr and Gächter (2000b) ). Receiving a gift from a seller is presumably perceived as a kind action. In reaction, a reciprocally motivated buyer would be inclined to buy more. The notion of reciprocity therefore predicts a positive correlation between gift giving and sales revenues. We expect that reciprocal motivations will tempt the buyer to return the favor when they receive a gift and predict a positive treatment eect, i.e., sales revenue will be higher in the Gift treatment than in the No Gift treatment.
Results
The results are presented in three steps. First, we outline the empirical strategy. In a second step after assessing the impact of gift giving on attention, we test whether buyers reciprocate positively upon receiving a gift. And third, we provide some evidence illustrating the relevance of contextual factors for the prevalence of reciprocal behavior.
Empirical Strategy
We assess whether observable covariates are statistically similar across treatments using Pearson's χ 2 tests for binary control variables and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for non-binary control variables (see Table 5 in the Appendix). With the exception of Category E we cannot reject the null hypothesis that control variables are balanced between treatments based on conventional signicance levels. Alternatively, we estimated a Logit model with treatment status as a dependent variable and all controls as explanatory variables. None of the coecients are signicantly dierent from zero and joint insignicance of all coecients cannot 6 be rejected (LR χ 2 (16) = 15.03, p = 0.552). In summary, the randomization resulted in a fairly well balanced set of buyers in the two treatment conditions. All of our regression models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The baseline model for the preceding analysis takes the following linear form:
where Y is either the total sales revenue or the number of oers sold per meeting 11 and Gif t is the binary treatment variable. In that the error term is potentially correlated within sellers, we include dummies for Seller 1 to Seller 4. In addition to taking care of the nonstandard error term, these seller xed eects capture dierences in selling style and past gift giving practices. We alternatively estimated all models using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with random eects specication of the error term. The results reported below are not sensitive to this manipulation. Similarly, the main results are qualitatively robust to a Tobit specication with bottom censoring at zero sales revenue (see Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix).
The variable Category E is included in all regression models as a control variable X in order to account for the condition that this variable is not perfectly balanced between treatments. Managers have potentially more authority to make acquisition decisions than regular employees do. In order to allow for dierent reactions to the gift between managers and regular employees we extend the baseline model by including a Gift*Manager interaction term.
To Give and Take
Starting a sales meeting with a gift could aect buyers' behavior in several ways. First, it could simply buy time. The average duration of a sales meeting is nine minutes in the No Gift treatment and ten minutes in the Gift treatment. Given that the act of handing over the gift is also time consuming, the net increase in attention seems negligible.
A second measure for the buyers' attention is the number of oers a seller is able to present (variable Oers shown). The sales booklet contained ve oers. The average number of oers shown is 3.79 in the No Gift treatment and 4.16 in the Gift treatment state. In Model (1) of Table 1 we regress Oers shown on the treatment dummy and the controls. The treatment variation does not signicantly explain the increase in Oers shown. In Model (2) we allow for dierences in the reaction to the gift between managers and regular sta (Gift*Manager ). The eect of the gift is augmented if the seller talks to a manager but the difference is not signicant. Managers consider signicantly less oers than regular workers.
In a next step we concentrate on the number of oers sold. Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 1 The regressions explaining the variable Oers sold (Models (3) and (4) of Table 1 ) underscore these results statistically. In Model (3) the coecient of Gift has the expected positive sign but it is far from signicance. Model (4) tests for dierences between managers and regular employees. Gift*Manager is large and signicant from an economic and statistical point of view (p < 0.05). The observation that managers react to the gift but regular employees do not is quite plausible if one considers that managers have generally more authority in decision-making. Furthermore, regular employees may not be allowed to keep the gift themselves.
Result 1: On average managers accept more oers in the Gift treatment than in the No Gift treatment. So far we have shown that the gift has no dramatic eect on attention but increases the number of oers sold to managers. However, the ultimately relevant measure for assessing the success of the gift is yet missing. Our hypothesis is that sales revenues are higher in treatment Gift compared to No Gift. Panel (c) of Figure 1 shows that this is clearly the case. Sellers more than double their revenue by handing out a gift. All but one seller achieved a higher sales revenue in treatment Gift than in No Gift. A conservative Wilcoxon signed-rank test using dierences between the sellers' averages in both treatments as observations rejects the null hypothesis that each seller has an equal sales revenue in Gift and No Gift (one sided p-value: p = 0.040, N = 5).
Panel (d) shows that the treatment eect is even more pronounced if sellers negotiate with store managers: sales revenue increases on average by more than 340 percent. A look at the sub-sample (N = 143) of meetings with regular employees (average sales revenue of 45.3 in Gift and 46.4 Swiss Francs in No Gift) suggests that the treatment eect in the total sample is entirely driven by the 9 managers. This point can also be inferred from Models (1) and (2) of Table  2 , where we explain sales revenue by the treatment variable and usual controls. The coecient is large and signicant for Gift, but becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero as soon as the Gift*Manager interaction term is included. Gift*Manager on the other hand is signicant and large: presenting a gift to the manager increases sales revenue on average by 187 Swiss Francs (Gift and Gift*Manager ).
Does the increase in sales revenue make it worthwhile for the rm to use the gift? In the whole sample revenue increases on average by 65 Swiss Francs due to the gift. Whether this makes the gift protable or not depends on the rm's prot margin. Given the cost of 10 Swiss Francs for the gift, a prot margin as low as 16 percent would suce to make the gift on average protable. We do not have exact information about the prot margin, but according to personal communication with the rm we know that it surpasses this threshold. When dealing with a manager the coecient estimates add up to 187 Swiss Francs. A prot margin of 5.4 percent would thus suce for the rm to break even. Assuming a prot margin of 25 percent, the gift generates four times more prot than it costs. Moreover the lower bound of the 95 percent condence interval for Gift*Manager is 28,9 Swiss Francs, which is well above the cost of the gift. Taken together, the results show that the gift increases the eciency of sales meetings substantially.
Result 2: The gift has a positive inuence on sales revenue. The increase in generated revenue is large enough to make it worthwhile for the rm to use the gift. The eect is driven by the sales meetings with the managers, among whom the use of the gift is highly protable.
Is the increase in revenue solely driven by the fact that the gift increases the number of oers sold? Comparing revenue between treatments conditional on that at least one product was sold (see Panel (e) of Figure 1 ) reveals a substantial treatment eect. The regression results in Model (3) of Table 2 show that, compared to the No Gift treatment, revenue is on average 156 Swiss Francs higher in the Gift treatment given that sellers have made a deal.
12 Hence, the treatment eects in the unconditional sample are not exclusively driven by a higher sales probability in Gift.
As described at the beginning of this section gift giving slightly, though insignicantly, increases buyers' attention. Greater attention might be responsible for the observed treatment eects. Oers shown is included in Model (4) and (3) is based on the sub-sample of observations with a positive revenue. Category E is included in the set of control variables for all reported models. In Model (3) Manager, Wholesaler 3 and Male are included as additional control variables as they are not perfectly balanced between treatments in the restricted sample.
(5) of Table 2 in order to isolate the impact of the gift from attention eects. Although the coecient of Oers shown is signicant, the coecient estimates for both, Gift and Gift*Manager, are robust to this specication. Hence, gifts inuence the sellers' success independent of attention.
Result 3: Conditional on that at least one product is sold the sellers obtain a substantially higher sales revenue in the Gift treatment than in the No Gift treatment. The eect of the gift remains strong when taking attention into account.
The First Time
Sellers often know their customers personally from earlier visits. In some of the sales meetings they talk to buyers they do not know. Our questionnaire data allows us to distinguish between these two cases. Much to our surprise, the variable Firstvisit proves to be a very decisive factor in our treatment eect. The gift is counterproductive and tends to lower sales revenue in situations (N = 82) where customers and sellers do not know each other: while the average revenue in the No Gift treatment is 23.5 Swiss Francs, it is only half the size in the Gift treatment (11.1 Swiss Francs). The regression results from Model (1) in Table 3 demonstrate a similar picture: the coecient of the Gift*Firstvisit interaction term is signicantly negative. Adding up the coecient estimates for Gift and Gift*Firstvisit yields a negative net gift exchange eect. However, the dierence is statistically insignicant (Wald test: F =1.92, p=0.167). Model (2) shows that, like above, the eect is mainly driven by the meetings with managers. The signicant three-way interaction between Gift, Firstvisit and Manager suggests that the negative rst-time eect is especially strong in sales meetings with managers.
13 Hence, customers do not buy more in the Gift treatment if they do not know the giver. 13 Gift*Firstvisit*Manager is negative but becomes insignicant with a Tobit specication of the latter regression model. See Table 7 in the Appendix.
14 One seller was newly hired during the period of the experiment and therefore did not know any of the buyers personally. This seller's revenue is on average lower in Gift than in No Gift. As mentioned above, the opposite holds true for all other sellers. The results are robust to the exclusion of observations stemming from this newly hired seller.
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We analyzed data from a natural eld experiment testing the importance of reciprocity in a competitive market with experienced agents. Sales representatives from a multinational consumer products rm were instructed to randomly distribute a gift to their business partners. Consistent with the notion of reciprocity, gifts increased the sellers' success in sales substantially, especially if they were handed over to the manager of the store. This result is remarkable given that the literature on gift-exchange has recently been challenged by studies showing that reciprocal behavior is of lesser importance in more naturally occurring settings (e.g. Gneezy and List (2006) , List (2006) ). Furthermore, there is some evidence that competition tends to reduce social preferences (Carpenter (2005) ), or diminishes the impact of social preferences on the outcome (Fischbacher et al. (2003) ). The customers in our experiment are observed in a natural and highly competitive setting. We therefore consider our result strong evidence for the signicance of reciprocal behavior.
However, our results also indicate that the prevalence of reciprocity is conditional on environmental factors. If sellers and buyers meet for the rst time and therefore do not know each other, no reciprocal behavior is observable. In contrast, the gift is rather counterproductive and hinders the sellers' success in sales. One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that the nature of the relationship determines how buyers interpret the receipt of gifts and the underlying intentions. Given that seller and buyer know each other the gift can be interpreted as a gesture of friendship. On the other hand, unfamiliar buyers may become suspicious and consider the gift as a persuasive attempt to push sales or even as a bribe. Trawick et al. (1989) conducted a survey among purchasing agents and found that gifts are considered to be less ethical and to negatively aect supplier choice if they are distributed to prospective instead of current customers. Another potential explanation for the absence of reciprocal behavior relates to the concept of social distance (e.g. see Homan et al. (1996) or Charness et al. (2007)). Buyers might perceive the social distance to be greater when dealing with an unknown customer and therefore feel less indebted to reciprocate.
15
This study focused on short run eects of gift giving. An interesting next step is to look at the role of intertemporal substitution and the role of adaptation in repeated gift giving. If the buyers in the Gift decrease their expenditures in subsequent sales talks, the long term eect of the gift might be zero. While our data does not allow to test this argument the results from Falk (forthcoming) and Bellemare and Shearer (2007) suggest that intertemporal substitution is unimportant for reciprocal behavior. Other contextual factors not analyzed in this paper might be of crucial importance for the prevalence of reciprocity in the eld. Such factors include for example the nature and value of the gift. Buyers would surely interpret 10 Swiss Francs in cash dierently than the six tubes of tooth paste. The dierent nature of gifts might also account for the mixed ndings from recent eld experiments. In fact our results are in line with Falk (forthcoming) , where a non-monetary gift is distributed, but dier from List (2006) , where the rst mover's gift is just cash. Hence, the absence of reciprocal behavior in the eld does not necessarily mean that people are not motivated by reciprocity. It might just be due to the fact that the receiver does not perceive the gift as a kind action. Analyzing the currency of reciprocity is an important task for future research. 
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